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USING GENDER AS A BASIS OF 

CLIENT SELECTION: 

A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 

JOAN MAHONEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Judith Nathanson is a lawyer in private practice. She has made 
a decision to represent only women in divorce cases, although she 
represents men in other matters. After seeking her services and 
being refused because of his gender, Joseph Stropnicky filed a com­
plaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
("MCAD").1 Following a hearing, the MCAD found Ms. Nathan­
son liable on the grounds that her practice is discriminatory. 
There is no question that Ms. Nathanson discriminated, in that 
. she chose her clientele based on gender. The question before the 
MCAD, and being discussed in this Symposium, is whether that 
particular form of discrimination is, or ought to be, unlawful. Most 
of us discriminate, one way or another, several times a week, at 
least. We decide which individuals to invite to a party, which col­
leagues with whom we will have lunch, which doctor or carpenter or 
shoemaker to patronize. All of these are discriminatory acts, in 
that we are choosing to associate or do business with one person or 
several persons, instead of others. But most of them are not unlaw­
fully discriminatory acts, either because the basis of the discrimina­
tion is permissible (this shoemaker does better work than the other, 
for example), or because the circumstances are simply not covered 
by law. Even if I deliberately choose to invite no people of color, or 
only people of color, to a party at my house, unless my house has 
become a place of public accommodation (and thus within the 
* Professor, Western New England College School of Law. A.B., 1964, Univer­
sity of Chicago; A.M., 1967, University of Chicago; J.D., 1975, Wayne State University; 
Ph.D., 1989, Cambridge University. I would like to thank Nancy Levit for her willing­
ness to discuss the ideas in this essay, as well as her editorial assistance. Any mistakes 
in interpretation are, of course, mine alone. 
1. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 
1997). 
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scope of state law2 or Title IP) or unless I am acting under color of 
state law (and thus within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment4 
and Section 19835), those choices are not legally redressable. 
Many issues relating to the practice of law raise concerns about 
treating a law office as a place of public accommodation and thus 
subject to the statute. In addition, a First Amendment defense 
could be offered regarding a lawyer's choice of clients. But those 
are concerns I leave to my colleagues. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that the Massachusetts statute applies to this situation, a 
significant issue still exists: whether the choice of clientele by Ms. 
Nathanson ought to be treated as unlawful discrimination. In mak­
ing that determination, one could approach the situation positively 
or normatively. That is, one could ask whether, under the current 
understanding of the law of discrimination, as defined largely by the 
United States Supreme Court, Ms. Nathanson's policy is illegal. Or, 
taking a normative approach, one could ask whether, looking at 
various feminist approaches to the law, her practices should be 
illegal. 
I. THE LAW REGARDING DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Standard for Gender Discrimination 
Just as in the early race cases, in the late 19th century, in which 
the Supreme Court upheld the concept of separate spheres for dif­
ferent races,6 the early cases also approved of separate spheres for 
men and women, as in Bradwell v. Illinois,7 which upheld the exclu­
sion of women from the practice of law. Beginning in the early 
1970's, however, the Supreme Court reversed course and began to 
strike down laws that discriminated on the basis of sex.s Unlike the 
race cases, however, in which the Court quickly settled on a stan­
2. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1996); see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993). 
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. II, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1994). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
5. See 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1994). 
6. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
8. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down a Louisiana 
law that excluded women from jury service); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973) (rejecting a federal law that made it easier for a serviceman to claim his wife as a 
dependent than it was for a similarly situated woman to claim her husband as a depen­
dent); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho law giving men a 
preference over women in the administration of intestate estates). 
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dard of review,9 it took some time before the Court established the 
appropriate standard in gender cases,t° finally resolving the issue in 
Craig v. Boren,u in which the Court held that, "[t]o withstand con­
stitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by 
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to ... those objectives."12 
The level of review described in Craig is usually referred to as 
intermediate scrutiny. It is neither as difficult for the government 
to defend its actions as is strict scrutiny, used in cases dealing with 
race, nor as difficult for the plaintiff to argue as is the rational basis 
test.13 Instead, each case involving gender discrimination tends to 
be fairly fact specific, and has been used both to uphold laws that 
discriminate on the basis of gender,14 and to strike them down.15 In 
some ways gender cases are different from those involving other 
groups that have suffered discrimination. Despite a long history of 
exclusion from public life and from equal participation in the eco­
nomic life of the country, many statutes and government practices 
were passed to protect women, and cases involving gender discrimi­
nation are as often brought by men as by women.16 One of the 
factors that the Court has looked at in these cases is the issue of 
whether the statute or practice in question has been one that per­
petuated stereotypes of gender roles.17 
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine 
of separate but equal); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding 
Japanese exclusion but applying strict scrutiny). 
10. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691-92 (disagreeing on whether the Court 
should use strict scrutiny or some lesser, but still heightened, standard of review). 
11. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
12. Id. at 197. 
13. The rational basis test is used when the group in question has not been de­
fined as discrete and insular, as described in the famous footnote 4 in United States v. 
Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and when the right involved has 
not been defined as fundamental, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432 (1985). 
14. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
15. Most recently, the Court rejected the exclusion of women from the Virginia 
Military Institute, a public school. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). 
16. In Craig, for example, the challenged statute allowed women to purchase beer 
at the age of eighteen, while men were not allowed to purchase beer until the age of 
twenty-one. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (striking down the exclusion of men from a nursing 
program at a state school); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (1981) ("[T]his Court has con­
sistently upheld statutes where the gender classification ... realistically reflects the fact 
that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances."). 
17. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down an Alabama statute 
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B. Affirmative Action 
Because traditionally state practices have discriminated both 
against and in favor of women, it makes the determination of 
whether a statute is intended as remedial, and therefore more likely 
to be upheld, more difficult. Nonetheless, the Court has been will­
ing to uphold gender classifications that benefit women when they 
are designed to remedy past discrimination.18 Most of the chal­
lenges to affirmative action programs have been in cases involving 
race. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,19 the Supreme Court 
held that the standard that applies when practices or statutes disfa­
vor a racial or ethnic group that has been the subject of discrimina­
tion also applies when statutes or practices are designed to benefit a 
previously disadvantaged group.20 In other words, it is not discrimi­
nation against a racial or ethnic minority that triggers strict scrutiny, 
but the use of racial or ethnic classifications for whatever purpose. 
As the Court held in Adarand, "federal racial classifications, like 
those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, 
and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest."21 What the 
Court has not yet made clear is what arguments the government 
could make to meet the standard, although there is clearly a split on 
that issue.22 
If, therefore, the Court were to apply the same symmetry in 
gender cases that it does currently in race cases, the test for reme­
dial actions, those designed to remedy past discrimination, would 
be mid-level scrutiny, just as it is used to determine whether an ac­
tion discriminates against women.' In other words, it should be eas­
ier to persuade the Court to uphold affirmative action programs 
aimed at women than those aimed at racial or ethnic groups. The 
analysis is not completely apposite, of course, because Ms. Nathan­
son's acts were private, and therefore were not covered by the Con-
that allowed the award of alimony to women but not men, on the ground that it perpet­
uated the stereotype that men supported their wives and that wives were always eco­
nomically dependent on their husbands but not the other way around). 
18. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a provision of 
the Social Security Act that calculated benefits in a way that was more advantageous to 
women). 
19. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
20. See id. at 227-29. 
21. Id. at 235 (citation omitted). 
22. Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Adarand stated that strict scru­
tiny was not necessarily fatal in fact, id., while Justice Scalia took the position that the 
Government could never use racial classifications to remedy past discrimination, id. at 
236 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment). 
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stitution in any event. On the other hand, the Court by and large 
has applied the same standards in constitutional cases and acts of 
private discrimination, or affirmative action, that were covered by 
federallaw.23 If, therefore, Ms. Nathanson were to argue that the 
statute ought not to apply, because her restricted practice was in 
fact an act of affirmative action, meant to redress discrimination 
against women, she might have a good claim. 
C. The Standard as Applied 
In the constitutional claim, the test in a mid-level scrutiny case 
is whether the state can show that the classification in question 
serves an important government objective, and whether the classifi­
cation is substantially related to that objective.24 Translating that 
test into the private context, the question would be whether Ms. 
Nathanson can show an important objective that is substantially re­
lated to the discrimination she engages in. Based on the evidence 
concerning the results of divorce on the status of women,2s and the 
fact that over the years she herself has found that women's exper­
iences and roles during marriage make it necessary to make differ­
ent arguments at the time of divorce, it would appear that she can 
meet that test. 
The most relevant recent case appears to be Mississippi Uni­
versity for Women v. Hogan,26 in which the Supreme Court ruled 
that restricting a nursing program at a state school that had been 
established solely for women violated the constitutional rights of a 
male applicant to the program.27 The basis for the decision was the 
rejection of the state's claim that the restriction was an affirmative 
action measure. Instead, the Court found that the exclusion was 
23. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) 
(holding that the case could be determined under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
although since the University of California is a state institution, the Fourteenth Amend­
ment was also applicable); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 
(1987) (upholding gender based affirmative action program under Title VII, based both 
on statutory and Constitutional precedent). 
24. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
25. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985). Although 
Weitzman's methodology has been criticized, see, e.g., Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. 
Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 
(1988), most studies support her basic conclusion, that women suffer economically as a 
result of divorce, see, e.g., James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic 
Disaster ofDivorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352 (1987); Heather R. 
Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). 
26. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
27. See id. at 730. 
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not necessary to compensate for past discrimination;28 and, indeed, 
the exclusion itself perpetuated stereotypes about the role of wo­
men.29 Finally, it was clear that the exclusion significantly disad­
vantaged Hogan and would have required him to attend a program 
at a considerable distance from where he lived and worked. 3D 
The circumstances of this case are very different. There is no 
evidence that Mr. Stropnicky was unable to secure a lawyer to rep­
resent him. Apparently, when Ms. Nathanson declined his case, he 
did not seek another attorney and executed the divorce agreement 
without having it reviewed.31 Furthermore, although women have 
traditionally found attorneys to represent them in divorce cases, if, 
in fact, women are economically disadvantaged as a result of di­
vorce, there is a good argument to be made that they need special­
ized services from someone committed to the specific issues that 
arise in their regard. Rather than perpetuating stereotypes, such 
representation simply treats women as unique and treats their con­
tributions to marriage as meaningful.32 
II. NORMATIVE STANDARDS: THE FEMINIST ApPROACH 
Again, assuming that the law should apply at all, most feminists 
presumably would object to the practice of a lawyer who restricted 
his or her clientele to men, just as we would be offended by a law­
yer who refused to represent people of color. But one of the ques­
tions this case raises is the issue of what we might call parity in 
antidiscrimination law, otherwise known as the test of whether 
what's good for the goose is good for the gander. 
Virtually no one believes in absolute parity; that is, that women 
should always be treated precisely the same as men and that people 
of color should always be treated precisely the same as whites. At a 
minimum, when acts of discrimination by government or industry 
have been demonstrated, remedial action to redress that wrong, 
even if it temporarily gives an advantage to employees or job appli­
28. See id. at 727-28. 
29. See id. at 729-30. 
30. See id. at 723-24 & 23 n.8. 
31. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MeAD 
Feb. 25, 1997). 
32. An argument can be made that because Mr. Stropnicky allegedly had main­
tained an untraditional role in his marriage, more like the traditional position that wo­
men have generally held, Ms. Nathanson could have represented him consistently with 
her goals. If, nonetheless, she believes that even men who occupy traditional female 
roles do better at the time of divorce or at reentering the job market, her original posi­
tion is not inconsistent. 
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cants of color is acceptable even to the most conservative members 
of the Supreme Court.33 Many people would go further than that 
and allow remedial action to achieve a more integrated work place 
or educational institution even without a showing of past pur­
poseful discrimination.34 
On the other hand, many people, including some feminists, 
would take the position that other than redressing past discrimina­
tion, or imbalances in the representation of women and people of 
color in institutions, everyone should be treated as similarly as pos­
sible. That position almost certainly would support the finding of 
the MCAD, that Ms. Nathanson was engaging in impermissible dis­
crimination when she restricted her divorce practice to women, un­
less, perhaps, she could show that women had a more difficult time 
securing representation, in which case her position might be defined 
as remedial. 
Many feminists would, however, disagree with the decision of 
the MCAD. The issue is not whether women have been unable to 
secure representation, but whether Ms. Nathanson believes women 
have different needs in divorce cases, that they need a particular 
kind of representation, which she is more capable of providing, or 
even simply more interested in providing. Some lawyers, for exam­
ple, only represent plaintiffs in tort cases, while others are more 
comfortable representing defendants. Most labor lawyers represent 
either unions or employers, but rarely represent both. In the crimi­
nallaw field, one either acts as a criminal defense lawyer or a prose­
cutor, but rarely in both capacities at the same time. The difference 
here, of course, is that sex discrimination is prohibited by law, 
whereas refusing to act for a cigarette company is not. But maybe 
the two situations have more in common than it would initially 
appear. 
A. The Equal Treatment Approach 
Although it is always risky to generalize, and feminist legal the­
ory has mUltiplied in recent years and ventured into wide-ranging 
analyses of the law,35 it is possible to divide feminist jurisprudence 
33. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, I., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
34. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
35. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 COR­
NELL L. REv. 575 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Rea­
sonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992); 
Martha Albertson Fmeman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 653 (1992). 
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into roughly three different categories. Probably the first group, 
historically, consists of what are usually called equal treatment fem­
inists, or those who take the position that as much as possible the 
law should treat men and women the same.36 Wendy Williams, one 
of the leading proponents of this position, has argued that women 
should reject laws that provide special benefits for pregnancy just as 
they would object to those that discriminate against pregnancy. She 
argues that 
the same doctrinal approach that permits pregnancy to be treated 
worse than other disabilities is the same one that will allow the 
state constitutional freedom to create special benefits for preg­
nant women. . .. If we can't have it both ways, we need to think 
carefully about which way we want to have it.37 
Using that approach, it would appear necessary to agree with 
the findings of the MeAD concerning Ms. Nathanson's restricted 
practice. Unless an argument can be made that women are unable 
to find representation in divorce cases, the fact that Ms. Nathanson 
believes that women have unique arguments to make, ones that she 
is either better prepared or more inclined to make, is irrelevant if 
one is firmly committed to the equal treatment model. A male at­
torney could just as easily claim, for example, that men are disfa­
vored in custody arrangements, that he is better prepared or more 
inclined to make the arguments on their behalf, and that he is 
therefore permitted to restrict his practice to men. In other words, 
the equality model feminists are fairly likely to accept the parity 
argument. 
B. Radical Feminist Thought 
On the other hand, the radical feminist school of jurispru­
dence, often referred to as the antisubordination model,38 is most 
likely to reject the parity argument. Whereas the equality model 
36. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984) 
[hereinafter Williams, Equality's Riddle]; Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: 
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 175 (1982) 
[hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis]; Nadine Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1686 (1980). For a discussion of this and other schools of feminist legal thought, 
see Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987). 
37. Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 36, at 196. 
38. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986); Ann Scales, 
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). 
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sees women as having been treated dissimilarly from men legally, 
with a goal of similar treatment, or sameness, the antisubordination 
model sees women as not the same, but rather as different as a re­
sult of a history of oppression. Catharine MacKinnon has written: 
Inequality because of sex defines and situates women as women. 
If the sexes were equal, women would not be sexually subjected. 
Sexual force would be exceptional, consent to sex could be com­
monly real, and sexually violated women would be believed. If 
the sexes were equal, women would not be economically sub­
jected, their desperation and marginality cultivated, their en­
forced dependency exploited sexually or economically.39 
The purpose of legal reform, then, for radical feminists, is to 
restructure law so as to end the oppression of women, rather than 
attempting to achieve sameness in the eyes of the law. An actual 
example of the differences between these approaches can be seen in 
the debate about maternity leave. California Federal Savings and 
Loan Association v. Guerra40 was a case challenging a California 
statute that provided maternity leave for women but no comparable 
leave for men.41 Feminists were sharply split on this issue and filed 
amicus briefs on both sides. Equal treatment feminists argued that 
the statute violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and also took the position 
that as a matter of policy, feminists should reject special accommo­
dations for women that were not similarly offered to men.42 On the 
other hand, antisubordination feminists took the position that real­
istically women bear the burden of not only pregnancy and child­
birth, but the bulk of the care for newborns, and that any 
government action that offers them protection ought not to be 
rejected.43 
Antisubordination feminists presumably would have no 
trouble justifying Ms. Nathanson's position, whether it was formally 
described as an attempt at affirmative action or not. Using the ar­
39. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
215 (1989). 
40. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
41. The more recent United States Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c. 
§ 2601 (1993), mandating a period of unpaid leave for new parents, whether by birth or 
adoption, and employees needing to care· for sick children or elderly parents, is gender 
neutral, as opposed to the earlier California statute. 
42. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 36, at 351-70. 
43. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: 
Equal Treatment, Positive Action, and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1983) (controversy concerning a Montana statute). 
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gument that women are usually in a worse economic position after 
a divorce than they were during the marriage,44 if a woman attorney 
chooses to use her energy to represent women instead of men, she 
should be allowed to do that, as her way of redressing what is in any 
event an inequitable situation. 
C. Cultural Feminism 
Although some overlap exists between all the approaches, a 
third type of feminist legal analysis, is usually referred to as cultural 
or different voice feminism.45 Much of the work in this area has 
been done as an analysis of the different way women would ap­
proach law and the legal system, as opposed to a specific critique of 
a statute or particular area of law, as the two schools discussed 
above are more likely to do.46 
Cultural feminists tend to look at the ways in which women are 
different, not presumably because of some reliance on genetics or 
physical characteristics, although the ability to bear children is cer­
tainly a physical difference that is reflected in women's approach to 
any number of issues, including those of law. The emphasis, how­
ever, is on the difference in women's experiences, within our cul­
ture, and how, as a result of those experiences, women look at legal 
issues and legal systems in ways that are, by and large, different 
from the ways that men qo. Robin West has written: 
Women are actually or potentially materially connected to other 
human life. Men aren't. This material fact has existential conse­
quences. While it may be true for men that the individual is 
"epistemologically and morally prior to the collectivity," it is not 
true for women. The potential for material connection with the 
other defines women's subjective, phenomenological and existen­
tial state, just as surely as the inevitability of material separation 
from the other defines men's existential state. Our potential for 
material connection engenders pleasures and pains, values and 
dangers, and attractions and fears, which are entirely different 
from those which follow, for men, from the necessity of 
44. See WEITZMAN, supra note 25, at 323. 
45. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (illustrating differences between the way young 
men and women think); see also Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987). 
46. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 3 (1988); Mary Joe Frug, Re·Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a 
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985). 
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separation.47 
Rather than looking at whether women have achieved formal 
equality within the legal system regarding the divorce process, or 
whether the results of divorce tend to continue the oppression of 
women, cultural feminists would be more likely to look at the way 
women experience divorce within the legal system. If, to oversim­
plify Carol Gilligan's approach, women are more concerned with 
relationships, and men are more concerned with rights,· then the 
way each approaches divorce, and, in particular the division of as­
sets and child custody, is likely to be very different. 
Given that, Ms. Nathanson's decision to restrict her divorce 
practice to women is perfectly understandable; she should be 
treated no differently than a lawyer who specializes in representing 
tort plaintiffs, unions, or criminal defendants. The issue is not 
whether she is, in fact, discriminating against men, but whether, 
having decided to specialize in the issues of concern to women in 
divorce cases, she would be either wasting her limited resources-in 
a lawyer's case, the resource in most demand being time-or taking 
on an issue, rather than a client, she was not fully prepared to rep­
resent. Suppose, for example, a lawyer has built his or her practice 
on the representation of plaintiffs in employment discrimination 
cases, and that, as a result, the lawyer's clients have consisted of 
women and people of color. Suppose also that a white male were to 
approach the lawyer and ask for representation in what is some­
times called a reverse discrimination case, that is, that the employer 
was trying so hard to hire women or people of color that this person 
did not get full and fair consideration for a position. If the lawyer 
turns the case down, using as shorthand that he or she does not 
represent white males in discrimination cases, what the lawyer 
would really mean is that he or she does not represent that kind of 
claim, rather than that kind of person. 
Using a cultural feminist approach, it would appear that Ms. 
Nathanson has built her practice on representing a certain kind of 
claim in divorce cases, one that is different from the kinds of claims 
men usually make, and that she is therefore justified in restricting 
her practice, that it is no more discrimination than it would be to 
restrict her practice to unions or employers, landlords or tenants, 
criminal defendants or the state. 
47. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. em. L. REv. 1, 14 (1988). 
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III. THE MCAD DECISION 

Obviously, the MCAD did not agree with this analysis. In­
stead, it held that a lawyer may not refuse to consider requests for 
representation by persons within a protected class, although appar­
ently a lawyer may ultimately refuse to represent a person if he or 
she feels antipathy to the cause of that potential client, possibly 
even if that means that the lawyer effectively refuses to represent 
all people in a protected class after considering their cases. The 
decision states: 
This ruling does not impinge upon Nathanson's right to devote 
her practice to furthering the cause of women as she defines that 
cause. Had Nathanson concluded that the issues raised by Com­
plainant's divorce action were not consistent with her specialty 
and area of interest and rejected Complainant on that basis, 
rather than solely because he is a man, the focus of this inquiry 
would be different. However, Nathanson never inquired into the 
nature or circumstances of Complainant's divorce case and stated 
only that she did not represent men in divorce cases.48 
In other words, had Ms. Nathanson taken up both her time and 
the Complainant's, interviewed him, and then informed him that 
she did not feel she could represent him properly, the MCAD prob­
ably would not have found in his favor. But because she had a pol­
icy of representing only women in divorce cases, she was deemed to 
be in violation of Massachusetts law. That result would certainly 
seem to elevate form over substance. 
Assuming, however,. that the MCAD actually meant what it 
seems to be saying then it is unlawful discrimination for Ms. Na­
thanson to restrict her divorce practice to women. The question, 
then, should be whether Ms. Nathanson is entitled to restrict her 
practice, or a portion of her practice, to people who have been his­
torically oppressed, whether she announces that policy to potential 
clients at the outset or screens them first before she turns them 
down. 
As discussed above, some feminist legal scholars are attracted 
to the parity argument, and would be likely to agree with the 
MCAD, assuming that other arguments regarding whether we 
should indeed treat the lawyer/client relationship as a place of pub­
lic accommodation are not persuasive. On the other hand, radical 
48. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 41 (MeAD Feb. 
25, 1997). 
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feminists would argue that women have been oppressed over the 
years, indeed, that women have been particularly oppressed by the 
economic effects of divorce,49 and that it is therefore perfectly ac­
ceptable for a woman attorney to choose to devote her energies to 
attempting to redress that imbalance by representing only women 
in divorce cases. Finally, cultural feminists would presumably agree 
with the argument regarding the effect of divorce on women.50 In 
addition, they would also be likely to see women's needs in the con­
text of divorce cases as different, and therefore justifying a decision 
to concentrate on representing those needs as opposed to others. 
CONCLUSION 
By applying a kind of formal equality, insisting that discrimina­
tion against men is legally no different than discriminating against 
women, the MCAD is, I believe, neither correctly following legal 
precedent nor, normatively, showing any understanding of the dif­
ference in the experiences of women, particularly in the context of 
divorce. Although Ms. Nathanson distinguishes the kinds of clients 
she chooses to represent by gender, at least in one part of her prac­
tice, she does so, presumably, in order to engage in a particular 
form of specialization, rather than because of gender-based animus. 
That decision should be treated no differently than other choices to 
specialize, to represent unions, criminal defendants, or civil rights 
plaintiffs. The MCAD's conclusion to do otherwise is neither com­
pelled by legal precedent, nor, I would argue, should it be com­
pelled by feminist legal theory. 
49. See WEITZMAN, supra note 25, at 323. 
50. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE 
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991). 
